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A Transactional Approach to Research Ethics
Wolff-Michael Roth
Abstract: Constructivist (constructionist) epistemologies focus on ethics as a system of values in 
the mind—even when previously co-constructed in a social context—against which social agents 
compare the actions that they mentally plan before performing them. This approach is problematic, 
as it forces a wedge between thought and action, body and mind, universal and practical ethics, 
and thought and affect. In this contribution, I develop a transactional approach to ethics that cannot 
be developed within constructionism. In a once-occurrent world, every act is ethical because it has 
consequences for the agent (who affects and is also affected), and the world as a whole. However, 
whereas many in the social sciences continue to articulate a theory of action and thus the practical 
nature of ethics in terms of the individual's act, in this contribution I show that the act always 
already is spread across people and things and, thus, is an integral and constitutive part of a 
transaction. This utterly relational take on human behavior thus undermines approaches to ethics 
that are based on the individual as unit of analysis. Most controversially perhaps, I exhibit how 
those who may feel hurt by the actions (talk) of others are themselves agents affecting those others 
and, thus, answerable. This approach is illustrated in the context of power-knowledge, which is the 
result of an always ongoing, only once-occurrent situated and situational struggle rather than 
something a priori distributed between people.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1 Problem and purpose
1.2 Self-action and interaction 
1.3 Transaction
2. Toward Translocution as Model of Social Action
2.1 Self-action, interaction, and ethics
2.2 Translocution and associated ethics
3. The Transactional Approach and the Question of Power
4. Transactional Ethics: From Analysis to Praxis
5. Coda
References
Author
Citation
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research (ISSN 1438-5627)
Volume 19, No. 3, Art. 1 
September 2018
Key words: 
transaction; 
translocution; joint 
action; reflexivity; 
postcolonialism; 
responsibility; 
answerability
FQS 19(3), Art. 1, Wolff-Michael Roth: A Transactional Approach to Research Ethics
1. Introduction
"The summons is understood only through the response and in it" (CHRÉTIEN, 2007, 
p.39).
"One cannot separate response from responsibility" (p.3).
"The one has no sense other than the-one-for-the-other: the diachrony of 
responsibility constitutes the subjectivity of the subject" (LEVINAS, 1971, p.45).1
These three introductory quotations constitute the sketch of a program. The first 
quotation states that some phrase is not understood on its own—i.e., does not 
"have" one "meaning" or several "meanings"—but only through the response it 
calls forth. Every action is a response to the summons of another person on 
situation. The second quotation adds that the response, and therefore every 
action, comes with responsibility. Finally, the third quotation elaborates the issue 
of responsibility, always for the other, and thus constitutes the very sense and 
essence of subjectivity. In this approach, ethics is not something added from the 
outside onto a previously conceived (planned) act but a quality inherent in 
person-acting-in-the-world-and-toward-others (i.e., in transacting). This quality 
cannot be legislated and enforced however much a research plan is vetted and 
shaped by passing the judgments of human research ethics committees. It forces 
us to move beyond ethics commonly conceived and move toward an approach 
grounded in collective responsibility and solidarity of researchers and participants 
(e.g., ROTH, 2006). After introducing and critiquing individualist and weakly social 
approaches to theory of actions, I present translocution as a model for acting in 
the social world. Translocution not only takes us to directly the inseparability of 
responsibility from the response that follows and affirms a summons but also to 
the diachrony of responsibility, that is, responsibility that is spread across speaker 
and recipient, agent and patient, humans and their world. The central point to be 
worked out in this contribution is this: research ethics works two ways rather than 
in the one way presupposed in current institutional processes of research ethics 
review. [1]
1.1 Problem and purpose
In qualitative research, ethics generally is considered through the lens of the 
researcher-agent. In countries where they exist, institutional ethics procedures 
are designed to protect the participant-patient. The position is apparent when—
e.g., in formal, institutional ethics review processes—the responsibility for the 
well-being of research participants is the responsibility of the researcher. This 
standard position of institutionalized ethics follows a Kantian logic that considers 
judgments and actions theoretically and detached from their immediate contexts 
and the actors' motives (e.g., ROTH, 2008). As a result, "the actual deed is cast 
out into the theoretical world with an empty demand for legality" (BAKHTIN, 1993, 
p.26). Ethics committees consider the (research) act theoretically and thus fail to 
1 All translations from other languages into English are mine.
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comprehend "the actually performed act, which is once-occurrent, integral, and 
unitary in its answerability" (p.28). The approach of thinking ethics through the 
agency of the researcher may be the case even for those who articulate a much 
more differentiated (e.g., feminist) view that use relational concepts, such as 
when women are said to "define themselves in terms of caring and work their way 
through moral problems from the position of one-caring" (NODDINGS, 2003 
[1984], p.8). The problem with the individualist and formal take on research ethics 
is that it first becomes an issue of the mind, which makes up plans of actions 
consistent with or against ethical standards that are subsequently implemented. 
The introductory quotations direct us toward and guide us along the way toward 
an ethics that does not first exist in the mind to be subsequently grounded in and 
made relevant to practical action. In the same way as the concordance of actions 
with the plans that initiated them can be assessed only after the fact (e.g., 
SCHÜTZ, 1932; SUCHMAN, 2007), so the concordance of the practical ethics 
with any formal ethics can be determined only after the fact. In the relational 
(transactional) approach, we are summoned by the words and deeds of others. 
This already places us in an obligation to answer and answer for (something and 
ourselves); and it does so in a way so that there exists a diachrony of 
responsibility. The purpose of this article is to show how a different form of 
(practical) ethics emerges when we consider the world from a transactional 
perspective with irreversible consequences for all involved (persons and things). 
In a transactional world, actions cannot be assigned to individuals (e.g., DEWEY 
& BENTLEY, 1999 [1949]) so that the responsibility for an act (blaming) cannot 
be attributed to them (ROTH, 2013, 2018). As the presentation and discussion 
below shows, the transactional approach implies ethics to be a quality of the 
situation as a whole. Thus, while not relieving qualitative researchers from 
responsibility, the approach makes it a quality of the historical situation as a 
whole. Before turning to exemplify and elaborate the transactional approach by 
means of a concrete situation, I distinguish it from the vastly more common self-
actional and interactional approaches. [2]
1.2 Self-action and interaction 
In this study, the adjective constructivist refers to the use of the term in the 
educational literature, where it denotes epistemologies according to which 
individuals are the authors of (their own) knowledge (VON GLASERSFELD, 
1989); it is a core presupposition of the self-actional approach. This knowledge, 
some of which exists in the form of sensorimotor schemas (VON 
GLASERSFELD, 2001), is the origin and cause of the action that the individual 
displays. The view therefore constitutes a self-actional theory of behavior—similar 
to what a cognitivist perspective yields. The individual act, arising from thought, is 
evaluated theoretically in terms of accepted rules and laws external to it. Social 
constructivists and others using the adjective social as a defining characteristic, 
while accepting the individual construction of conceptual knowledge and 
sensorimotor schemas, attribute to relations a certain force that regulates the 
nature of knowledge in the social arena before individuals internalize this 
knowledge for themselves. Although self-action is integral to such theories, the 
social is recognized in the role researchers attribute to the interactions between 
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members of a group. Interaction means that one action follows another reacting 
to the one(s) preceding it; and the members of the group orient toward the 
possible reactions of others. Interaction thus means that individual (self-) actions 
come to be juxtaposed and chained, such as when replies are said to follow 
questions, each taken as existing in their own right. In so doing, constructivist 
theories take the social to be a contingent factor in the construction of knowledge 
and action. Approaching the social as a contingent factor, constructivism 
(constructionism) constitutes the social in a weak sense (LIVINGSTON, 2008). 
What comes to be an accepted and dominant form of knowledge, theory, or 
discourse is the result of the interplay (e.g., in negotiation) of different positions 
that individuals take in the public arena. The outcomes of the social processes, 
interactions, are the results of social constructions. The social (constructivist) 
constructionist positions give primacy to these interactions—but do not (tend to) 
abandon the individual as the origin of actions. A lot of qualitative research takes 
precisely this epistemology as foundational. [3]
Philosophers and social scientists from very different traditions have critiqued this 
take on actions in the social world. From a Spinozist-Marxian position, for 
example, there is no sense to ground actions in the thoughts of individuals, for 
"all talk of thought first arising and then 'being embodied in words,' in 'terms' and 
'statements,' and later in actions, in deeds and their results ... is simply 
senseless" (IL'ENKOV, 1977, p.44). Similarly, there is very little sense to reducing 
social action to the sequencing of individual actions to make them interactions: 
"Collective action, in its modes, possibilities, and laws cannot be reduced to a 
sum of individual actions" (CHRÉTIEN, 2007, p.194). [4]
1.3 Transaction
In the transactional approach, actions are inherently rather than contingently 
social (e.g., MEAD, 1938). The adjective transactional is used here to denote a 
theoretical approach that no longer accepts the primacy of the individual in 
interaction with others but instead takes a transactional world as its ontological 
starting point. Every act is recognized to be cooperative, requiring two or more 
individuals working in concert. Some readers may find this idea difficult to grasp 
because we are so used to ascribing actions to individuals (e.g., the content of 
statements individuals make are said to be their beliefs, opinions, or knowledge). 
But the consideration of a simple situation shows that more needs to be done 
theoretically than adopting the common sense position. Consider the case where 
an intended act (e.g., to make a joke) differs from its effect (e.g., a person is hurt 
or insulted). The effect will be that the pair (group) now is confronted with the 
reality and problem to be addressed. This shows that the act cannot be conflated 
with the intention of the agent, as self-actional and interactional approaches do, 
for what actually happened also is a function of the recipient (patient). But in other 
situations, the same phrase (action) may indeed be heard as intended (i.e., as a 
joke). In the transcription of the event from the actual world to the narrative, 
something that depends on all participants comes to be ascribed to one of the 
individuals. [5]
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The recognition that something important happens in the "transcription" of actions 
is not new. The predicative nature of (Western) language separates the agent 
from the action according to the principle that there is a cause to every change. 
"But this conclusion already is mythology: it separates that which effects from the 
effecting. When I say 'the lightening flashes,' I have posited the flash once as an 
activity and a second time as a subject" (NIETZSCHE, 1922 [1885/1886], p.43). 
In the processes, a new and different form of Being has been attributed to the 
event. The subject is and remains but no longer becomes. In attributing actions to 
agents, we are misrepresenting the transactional nature of the world: "To set the 
event as cause: and the cause as Being: this is the double error, or interpretation, 
of which we are guilty" (ibid.). In other words, the event is decomposed into an 
effect and a cause, and the effect is attributed to the cause as a property. The 
alternative position is to take properties of persons and things as effects upon 
other persons and things, the result of which would be that if the other persons 
and things do not exist or are imaginatively eliminated, then persons and things 
no longer have the property. That is, "there is no thing without other things" and 
"there is no 'thing in itself'" (p.61). [6]
An action only becomes a thing that can be ascribed to an individual under the 
condition that it has been objectified; and this objectification occurs in a process 
that resembles the transcription of a translocution into a sequence of locutions 
(RICŒUR, 1986). It is in the process of fixing the (speech) act to the individual 
that it becomes objectified. Thanks to this objectification, "the action is no longer 
a transaction" (p.191) but ascribed to an individual agent who is said to be the 
cause of the action. In the same move, the signification ("meaning") of the act is 
detached from the action as event. This also is the conclusion within a very 
different philosophical tradition according to which individual "properties" really 
are the effects of relationships, which are not internal to or characteristic of 
individuals. Thus, "it is nonsense to talk about 'dependency' or 'aggressiveness' 
or 'pride,' and so on. All such words have their roots in what happens between 
persons, not in some something-or-other inside a person" (BATESON, 1979, 
p.133). In many aboriginal languages, the relational nature is part of naming—
such as when Palauans change denoting snapper by the generic term richoh to 
hatih, hard to find; when they denote a fish species as Hari merong, always bites, 
takes any bait; or when they use the term yetam, travels with the father, for a fish 
that generally accompanies larger fish (JOHANNES, 1981). In this language, 
therefore, the concept nouns express the relation of the fish to the fisher or the 
fish to the bait. To work out a number of aspects that arise from a transactional 
perspective on research ethics, I develop and exemplify translocution as a model 
of joint, inherently (rather than contingently) social action. [7]
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2. Toward Translocution as Model of Social Action
Text has been shown to be a useful model for the social sciences interested in 
the understanding of action that makes sense [action sensée] (RICŒUR, 1986). 
In the preceding section, I refer to the position that the world inherently is 
transactional. Because spoken language occurs in the event of translocution, the 
latter can be used as a model for relations that make the human social world. 
Theorizing the act in terms of translocution comes with the affordance of a pairing 
and co-implication of response (answer) and responsibility (answerability). This 
pairing and co-implication exists in many other languages as well, including and 
exemplified in the pairs Antwort-Verantwortung (Ger.), réponse-responsabilité 
(Fr.), and otvet-otvetstvennost' (Rus.). In the following, I begin by exemplifying 
the common (self- and interactional) approach to conversation (thus action) and 
proceed to present a translocutional model of social action. This model serves as 
the basis for developing a transactional position on ethics. [8]
2.1 Self-action, interaction, and ethics
"Formal ethics provides no approach to a living act performed in the real world." 
(BAKHTIN, 1993, p.27)
Fragment 1 derives from an interview, where a researcher (R) interviews three 
individuals who, one year earlier, had been part of a special school science 
curriculum designed such that young students can contribute to the 
environmental activism in their community. One of the three interviewees (P) was 
the chaperon of one group of students in the teaching of the curriculum. 
Fragment 1 [9]
The first feature to be noted is the attribution of each turn to an individual: always 
that individual, from whose mouth the phrase or phrases have come. This 
attribution of the phrase to the individual allows researcher to speculate what the 
speaker means to say—often without explicitly saying so—and what the speaker 
is doing. For example, the participant may be said to "claim" that he remembered 
a lot of things about the science lessons that had taken place one year earlier. 
Then, the researcher, who is assumed to have interpreted what the preceding 
speaker has stated, might be said to be "critiquing" or "questioning" the preceding 
claim by noting that the participant had not (previously) recalled an incident 
involving a falling tree. Finally, the participant might be described as "admitting" 
that he had forgotten, which also means admitting that the case was overstated, 
and then phrasing his position that also "saves face." The individualistic approach 
is apparent in this quite standard reading of the fragment. Qualitative researchers 
are in the business of making statements about the "meanings" that the 
individuals "make," and about the differences between that might be the cause 
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for misunderstandings. Other qualitative researchers, interested in the concept of 
identity, may even write about positioning, and how the participant attempts to 
construct an aspect of his identity, as an individual who remembers past events 
very well. But there are also interactional elements to the story in the sense that 
the participant partially retracts and modifies his position in reply to the critique 
(Turn 2). This may lead researchers to conclude that the identity of an individual 
is not merely the result of a personal construction but indeed is the result of a 
negotiation in a third, public space different from the original and elementary 
spaces that are but mobilized in the production of meaning (BHABA, 1994). In 
this view, the participant tries to position himself in a particular way but is forced 
to reposition when the researcher, by means of her critical comment, undermines 
the specific positioning move. [10]
Some readers may be familiar with speech act theory (AUSTIN, 1962) and 
conversation analysis (SACKS, 1992); others may have had opportunities to 
observe an interactional approach to dialogical theory (BAKHTIN, 1981). All these 
theoretical takes emphasize the need to consider pairs of turns as a unit. Thus, 
for example, a question is a question because there is a reply; and a reply is a 
reply because there is a question. In the fragment, the pairing {Turn 1 | Turn 2} 
may be described as a {claim | rejection} or {claim | critique} pair. Drawing on 
these theories, qualitative researchers attempt to put together what previously 
was taken apart. But these attempts generally fail because, for example, the 
illocutionary act—what the speaker tries to do—still belongs to the individual 
speaker. The turn pairs become social because there are two individuals 
participating in the exchange. Claim and critique still are attributed to the 
individuals. The ethical dimension of the critique (Turn 2) may still be attributed to 
the researcher. And it is not far-fetched at all but rather common to read research 
reports where such a turn at talk then is interpreted in the context of the idea of 
power-over: here, the researcher in a power-over the researched situation. [11]
The theory of (self- and inter) action developed here is associated with a 
particular approach to ethics. In the metaphysics of morals, a single imperative is 
sufficient to deduce all imperatives of duty. This imperative therefore is 
categorical: "only act according to that maxim by which you simultaneously can 
will that it should become a general law" (KANT, 1956 [1785], p.51) or, in other 
words, "act such that by your will the maxim of your action could become a 
general law of nature" (p.51). In this formulation, the categorical imperative 
embodies an individualist subjectivist approach. A maxim governs what the 
individual does. It is a subjective rule of action that could become an objective law 
and, thus, is contrasted with the objectivity of the latter. This subjectivist element 
makes the Kantian approach suitable as a formulation of ethics within (radical) 
constructivism, or it constitutes a personal formulation of how to act that does not 
involve the coercion on the part of others. It is the most foundational rule on the 
basis of which all "subjective rules of action" may be generated (VON 
GLASERSFELD, 2009, p.118). This approach may be combined with the 
subjective construction of the other to whom are attributed rules of action similar 
to our own. This then leads to a more viable approach to ethics, where the 
individual also takes into account the rules of actions it attributes to others. Thus, 
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the (radical) constructivist position "suggests that if actions of 'others' that you 
have constructed—a construction that is not ad lib but is constrained by facts of 
experience—can be interpreted as similar to your own, they may confirm a 
second-order viability" (p.119). Formal ethics constructed on the grounds of 
reason fails the subject of the ethics of the real, once-occurrent act because, as 
the introductory quotation to this section states, it does not provide us with an 
avenue to the living act. This is so because developing exclusively within the 
bounds of Kantianism, formal ethics "conceives of the category of the ought as a 
category of theoretical consciousness, i.e., it theoretizes the ought, and, as a 
result, loses the individual act or deed" (BAKHTIN, 1993, p.25). Formal ethics 
based on a constructivist theory of action therefore does not provide us with the 
means of grasping the ethical dimensions of the real, living act as it unfolds and 
plays itself out in the social world. [12]
2.2 Translocution and associated ethics
The common form of transcribing a conversation constitutes an insidious 
reduction of complex social world into a simple give and take. A different picture 
about actions and the relation between human beings emerges when we include 
the recipient (listener), as shown in the revised Fragment 1. It is acknowledged 
that this does not lead us to a transcription of the event as a whole, which alone 
could avoid "los[ing] the very sense of its being an event, that is, precisely that 
which the performed act knows answerably and with reference to which it orients 
itself" (BAKHTIN, 1993, p.31). But the revised transcription allows us to see 
enough to institute the move to the transactional perspective advocated here. 
Thus, if there were no recipient, there would not be a relation at all but two 
independent producers of sounds that have nothing to do with one another. 
However, rather than approaching the fragment from the perspective of two 
individuals, whose actions build on the actions of the other, we may "begin to 
think of the two parties to the interaction as two eyes, each giving a monocular 
view of what is going on and, together, giving a binocular view in depth. This 
double view [then] is the relationship" (BATESON, 1979, p.133). Saying 
inherently is contact with the other, always associated with a wound or caress 
(LEVINAS, 1971). The revised transcription represents the sound-words, not 
individual meanings, intentions, feelings, and so on.
Fragment 1, revised [13]
The revised transcription takes into account that each phrase not only exists in 
the mouth of the speaker but also rings in the ears of the recipient (words against 
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grey background). These are the same sound-words in the two cases—a fact that 
is marked here by means of a solid box. This box does stand for a joint, social 
event: corresponding. There are two ways of hearing the term corresponding, 
both of which are pertinent here. First, corresponding signifies participating in a 
communicative exchange—traditionally this has been in the form of sending 
letters, but today occurs more frequently in the forms of email, text messages, 
and other electronic forms. There is an exchange, and what is exchanged, the 
word or phrase, is common to the pair. This leads us directly into the second 
issue: corresponding as "to be in accord" or "to agree with." Corresponding, 
because it always involves two or more individuals, inherently is a social event in 
which two or more people are involved. The concept is consistent with a 
pragmatic philosophy of ethics and the act according to which there is nothing 
subjective and psychological about the act considered "from within the act itself, 
taken in its undivided wholeness" (BAKHTIN, 1993, p.29), where each act is 
understood to be only a phase in the life process so that its sense in a strong 
sense depends on the world as a whole (cf. DEWEY, 1938; MEAD, 1932; 
VYGOTSKIJ, 2002 [1934]). It also allows us to understand that there is an 
unavoidable asymmetry, which arises not because of the different roles that the 
participant and the researcher take, but because "appeal and reply do not 
converge onto a common" (WALDENFELS, 2006, p.66). [14]
We may indeed deepen our analysis by taking a closer look at the phenomenon 
of corresponding. It consists, on the one hand, of speaking and, on the other 
hand, of the simultaneous actively attending to and receiving. That is, the 
constitutive parts of corresponding are several actions, which are spread over the 
group (here pair). The social act of corresponding, in technical terms, is diastatic 
and dehiscent, that is, it is one whole spread out over two or more parts that 
constitute a unity despite a gaping, abyssal separation. There is no 
corresponding of just one person. It takes the joint action of several persons to 
realize an event of corresponding. We may also speak of the coming and going 
that is involved within corresponding. Thus, whereas we may envision a 
movement from the speaker to the recipient, there would be no effect unless 
recipients were actively directing their attention toward speakers—there is a 
movement from recipients (patients) to speakers (agents). In addition, on the part 
of the recipient, the orientation (movement) toward the speaker is paired with an 
(active) opening up and willingness to receive (i.e., a movement from speaker to 
the listener). [15]
In many and perhaps most social situations, the standard maximum silence 
between two speakers is of the order of one second (JEFFERSON, 1989), but 
often times, as in schools, it is even shorter. This leaves far too little time between 
the end of the saying—at which instant the said is constituted—and any possible 
interpretation that the listener could have produced, made up a reply in the mind, 
and prior to the resulting speaking. We know this to be the case because 
research in the cognitive sciences shows that even the mental rotation of a very 
simple object composed of between one and five squares followed by an action 
on this object takes more than one and one half seconds (KIRSH & MAGLIO, 
1994). This has two important implications. First, recipients are affected prior to 
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knowing by what they are affected (WALDENFELS, 2006), that is, before 
knowing the content of the act as the result of interpretation. Second, the reply is 
beginning to form before the Saying has ended (e.g., VOLOŠINOV, 1930); that 
is, it is forming before the recipient is able to know the (content of the) Said with 
any precision. [16]
In Turn 2, for example, the recipient (male) does not know what is coming at him. 
When the "but" sounds, he does not know the said of the phrase that is in the 
course of unfolding; and he cannot know it right up until the instant when saying 
has ended, which is the earliest point at which such knowledge could exist. In 
fact, numerous scholars have pointed out that the speaker is in the same 
position, knowing the result of her thinking only when speaking has ended, for 
thought becomes itself in speaking (e.g., MERLEAU-PONTY, 1945; VYGOTSKIJ, 
2002 [1934]). This has a radical consequence: if the content of the act cannot be 
known by agent and patient alike, its ethical dimension (e.g., conformity with  
rules and laws) unfolds in practice but cannot be known and evaluated with any 
certainty until after the social act has been completed. Any ethical consideration 
from outside the act will have to assume it as already completed, on a theoretical 
plane and in contemplated form (typical for some discussions in institutional 
ethics committees). Such considerations cannot account for the actual, concrete 
historicity of the act, characterized by a specific emotional-volitional tone 
(BAKHTIN, 1993). The example also shows that the recipient, far from merely 
being affected, contributes to being affected by opening up. He opens up, and in 
so doing, makes himself vulnerable. That is, the researcher (female) does not just 
act upon him; she does not just doing something to him (e.g., enact a critique or 
accuse him of lying) with her words. He opens up and thus exposes himself. But 
more so, whatever the interviewer's intentions (if she had formulated them for 
herself prior to opening the mouth to sound the phrase), the hearing contributes 
to the nature of the social act. But this means that the speaker has exposed 
herself: Saying constitutes exposition and exposure of one to another. This is so 
because "being-for-the-other, in the manner of the Saying, is therefore exposing 
to the other that signification itself" (LEVINAS, 1971, p.42). What is being done is 
the outcome of their joint doing rather than the doing of one (who critiques, 
accuses) or the other (who interprets). Turn 2 also allows us to see the evaluative 
accent that comes with each actualized word. On the one hand, the content of the 
phrase simply is a factual statement about what has or has not occurred in the 
preceding part of the conversation: the participant did not remember the event 
with the falling tree. The phrase begins with the connective "but," which, as the 
unfolding event shows, is employed and taken in its contrastive function: the "I 
remember a lot" comes to be contrasted by "but you didn't remember." That 
evaluation is taken up and directly addressed in the reply (Turn 3). [17]
There is a second, horizontal dimension in the revised fragment that has not yet 
been considered. The blue, dotted box pulls together into one: 1. the origin of the 
spoken phrase (Turn 2) in the word of the other, 2. the phrase (locution), and 3. 
its affect on the other. It is apparent that important aspects of both the origin and 
the effect of the locutionary act lie outside of the speaker. The blue box 
(Fragment 1, revised) marks another social act: responding. This act is spread 
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over an extended period of time and over the (social) situation: from its beginning 
(active attention to the other, reception) to its execution and to its effect. 
Technically, therefore, responding is diachronic (WALDENFELS, 2006), 
consisting of the couplet {actively attending & receiving | replying | affecting}. 
Responding therefore does not belong to the researcher, and, as a Marxian-
Spinozist analysis reveals (IL'ENKOV, 1977), the thinking associated with the 
speech act reaches from its initiation from outside the person to the realization of 
its effect in the world. There cannot be a cause and effect relation between 
thought (or thinking) and the act. The speaker, as all "thinking things in the world 
of all other things" (p.52), is part of a whole situation. To understand "her" 
thinking, one has to go beyond inside her body (brain) "and examine the real 
system within which [speaking] is performed" (p.52). Responding thus is 
dehiscent and diachronic in nature. The diachrony, which is coincidence of the 
non-coinciding, makes visible an incessant dispossession of individual intention in 
the face of the collective act. With this dispossession, "nothing remains: neither 
clothing, nor peel, nor shell, nor even the cover conferring identity. Dispossession 
right to the core, ab-solution—this diachrony signifies the absolutely one" 
(LEVINAS, 1971, p.43). This one does not have to be reconstructed but, in the 
transactional approach, is the original point of departure. The latter two parts—
i.e., replying and affecting—also are part of the next irreducible triplet of actions 
that constitute another act of responding. Responding not only implies taking up 
the appeal on the part of the preceding speaker, responding to the other 
[répondre à], but also a form of vouching for [répondre de] the other: from whom 
the word has come, for whom the word is designed, and to whom the word 
returns (see blue box). [18]
3. The Transactional Approach and the Question of Power
Institutional ethics procedures often simplistically assume researchers to have 
power or to have one up in a power-relation with participants. There are 
suggestions that the notion of power should be distrusted, as it is the most 
dangerous of all quasi-physical metaphors used in the social sciences 
(BATESON, 1979). The view of the researcher as in power over the research 
participant is simplistic because, in protocols and agreements that retain the 
participants' rights to withdraw at any time, the researcher no longer is in 
unilateral control over the data. If a participant withdraws after the data collection 
has been completed, all the effort expended in creating the data has been in vain. 
The effect is particularly dramatic if the participant is an institution leading to the 
deletion of the data from all participants that are also members of the institution. 
We thus need to move beyond simplistic notions of power—which, in this section, 
is treated in an exemplifying manner for showing how the transactional approach 
changes the way in which research ethics might be approached. [19]
The framework worked out in the preceding section has considerable 
consequences for how we think about research ethics. The problem with a 
Kantian approach to ethics lies in the way that the norm (rule) applying to the act 
has to be justified as capable to serve as universal law. This justification is 
accomplished "by way of purely theoretical determinations: sociological, 
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economic, aesthetic, scientific" (BAKHTIN, 1993, p.26). The purely theoretical 
ground of the justification fails to live up to the real act, which, as shown above, 
always and irreducibly has consequences for all parties involved. It is precisely 
here that the gap between the formal ethics of institutional ethics review regimes 
and practical ethics comes to the fore. Paraphrasing RICŒUR (1990), we might 
say that the practical wisdom in research collaborations (researchers and 
participants) exists in inventing conduct that will best satisfy any exception that 
caring and affective attention (i.e., solicitude) requires while betraying any stated 
formal rule to the smallest possible extent. Turn 2 in the fragment constitutes a 
more benign case of considering practical ethics in actual conduct, for the 
possibility is given for participants to get hurt if they are "accused" of 
"overstating," "being inconsistent," or indeed of "lying" when a contradiction in 
their narration becomes apparent. But we do have to go further than RICŒUR in 
our considerations, because the preceding position still allows us to lapse into an 
individualist position. Whereas the researcher in the preceding fragment did 
formulate the phrase, which indeed constitutes a true statement of facts, it 
contains an evaluation that is not just hers (whatever she might have intended) 
but also receives part of its content from the response. A first step in our analysis 
is to acknowledge that "a performed act is active in the actual unique product it 
has produced" (BAKHTIN, 1993, pp.26-27). [20]
As soon as we think about actions that make sense from a transactional 
perspective, all those taking part in an event are and become responsible prior to 
and transcending any intention. In Turn 2, the speaking researcher is responsible 
for what she says even though the recipient cooperates in the constitution of (the 
content of) the said. She is responsible even though she is not in control and 
even though the completion of (the content of) the act lies in the future direction 
from the point of her speaking. The participant, too, partially is responsible for the 
content of the saying, that is, the said. From this exemplary analysis, we therefore 
come to the same conclusion that has resulted from a philosophical analysis: 
"Responsibility ... always simultaneously is co-responsibility, a practical and 
collective responsibility. For responsibility always remains a response to that what 
precedes us and to what surrounds us" (CHRÉTIEN, 2007, p.195). That is, in the 
take on research ethics developed here, the "victim" of the critique (of overstating 
a case) or accusation (of lying) is an integral part in the constitution of the event 
and, therefore, in the very nature of his being a victim. Such a perspective, 
therefore, radically changes ethics generally and the issue of power-over 
specifically. As apparent and exemplified in a quotation above, in some 
theoretical frameworks it makes no sense to take about something such as 
aggressiveness as a characteristic (property) of an individual. In the same way, 
power is not a property or characteristic of an individual, who somehow 
appropriates it, but is instead the result of a microphysics that has effects on the 
human body (FOUCAULT, 1975). This microphysics is to be studied in terms of 
an inherent "network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a 
privilege that one might possess" (p.35). Power, or rather, the distribution of 
power-knowledge, is the result of relations, is exercised collectively rather than 
possessed as a privilege (e.g., by some "dominant" class or its members). The 
victims of power are integral and thus irreducible part of the phenomenon of power:
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"this power is not solely and simply applied, as an obligation or interdiction on those 
who 'do not have it'; it invests them, is transmitted by and through them; it rests upon 
them just as they, in their struggle against it, in turn rest upon the grip that it has on 
them" (ibid.). [21]
Once we begin thinking power or rather power-knowledge in terms of relations, 
where those subject to power are as integral to and active in the phenomenon as 
those who are seen to have a hold on it, then we have to reconsider how we think 
about ethics and responsibility. Responsibility in the transactional take presented 
here is radical in the sense that instead of allowing us to discover in it the 
essence of subjectivity and identity, we take it as not stopping to dispossess the 
individual. It dispossesses the individual to the point of a unity that cannot be 
constituted on the basis of individual persons. Individuals cannot be said to have 
or have not responsibility. Ethics and responsibility are to be investigated in the 
same way as power-knowledge relations the (qualitative) researcher; they are 
aspects of the power-knowledge relations. These relations have to be studied as 
a phenomenon sui generis, for "only if you hold on tight to the primacy and 
priority of relationship can you avoid dormitive explanations" (BATESON, 1979, 
p.133). [22]
The need to reconsider power in research arose for me in a project where my 
research team conducted think-aloud protocols with experts (scientists) talking 
about graphs. In one part of the project involved physicists. An undergraduate 
student majoring in physics and anthropology collected the data. This 
configuration created an interesting complication to the question of power that 
may not be solvable from the classical perspective. Thus, as a member of the 
research team, the undergraduate student may be said to be in a power-over 
situation with respect to the physics professors—indeed, by asking the 
undergraduate student whether they were right, they treated him as if he knew 
and was in control over the correct answer (cf. ROTH & MIDDLETON, 2006). But 
simultaneously, these professors are in a power-over situation with respect to the 
undergraduate student in their department. To complicate the matters a little 
further, the data was collected in the offices of the department rather than on 
some neutral ground that some researchers might chose in the attempt to disrupt 
the power relations that they presuppose. In the concrete case to be considered 
here, the question is related to the one about knowledge. Who is an expert in 
relation to the graphs that the research team presented to the participants? Is 
there a difference for those graphs that come from the discipline of physics and 
those that come from the discipline of biology? It turns out that this question 
cannot be answered based on an abstract analysis; or, if such an analysis were 
conducted, it likely would not describe the situation that was actually observed. 
For example, in one situation a professor, apparently having some trouble to 
make sense, begins asking the researcher to provide him with a clue. What then 
happens in the videotape best is described as a form of struggle: the videotape 
makes apparent the effort of the assistant to avoid providing assistance or 
answers—as per the research protocol—while simultaneously making apparent 
the physicist's attempt to get some help. In the end, the undergraduate student-
researcher tutors the physicist in reading the graph. However, on the way, one 
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can observe continued struggles over who knows and what the relevant 
knowledge is, such as in the description of a graph as a simple mathematical 
derivative or a second derivative of some population function (see Fragment 2). 
That is, even though the professor repeatedly has asked for help (e.g., "give me 
a hint," "give me a clue," "is that correct?" and "where is your hints?"), thus 
indicating a lack of knowing-how to read the graph, in the actual working through 
there are continued struggles over the correct way of describing the graphs and 
determining the pertinent signifieds.
Fragment 22 [23]
From a practical perspective on ethics, the ethical question may be rested on the 
researcher's behavior (RICŒUR, 1990). He would be put in the position to 
develop behavior that corresponds to the solicitude of the situation while 
minimally breaking the rules of research method and ethics. On the one hand, 
there is an apparent request for help; on the other hand, the research protocol 
states that the only researcher actions to take place while participants are solving 
the task should be those encouraging the latter to think aloud (when they have 
fallen silent). In the present study, a different take is suggested, on in which the 
questions of ethics and their solutions are the result of the joint transactional work 
of the pair. There are suggestions that social science methods need to account 
for these (researcher-participant, observer-observed) transactions or they miss 
the very nature (essence) of the phenomenon of interest (BATESON, 1979; 
DEVEREUX, 1968; DEWEY & BENTLEY, 1999 [1949]). [24]
The discussions of power-over often concern the questions about the ownership 
of knowledge, beneficiaries of the research project, and the relevant forms of 
interpretational expertise. The discussions tend to be classical even in cases 
where authors strive toward developing postcolonial positions where knowledge is 
described as something (indigenous) peoples have (and own) and power (control) 
that others have over knowledge in imposing their interpretations. The tensions 
are apparent in phrases such as this: "despite the fact that all peoples have 
knowledge, the transformation of knowledge into a political power base has been 
built on controlling the meanings and diffusion of knowledge" (BATTISTE, 2008, 
p.500, emphasis added). In the approach proposed here, there is no place for 
knowledge and power to be had and owned like an object, especially not by 
individuals and individual institutions. [25]
2 The square brackets "[" and "]" mark the beginning and ending of overlapping features in 
consecutive turns; the caret ">" marks turns of special interest; and transcriber comments are 
enclosed in double parentheses—e.g., "((inaudible))."
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The question of benefits—e.g., "What knowledge is produced?" and "Where does 
it become a resource?"—does not have simple and simplistic answers. The same 
research project then may produce different knowledge resources for different 
communities benefiting participants and researchers alike. Thus, one of my 
projects included collaborating with an airline. We agreed beforehand to have two 
forms of outcome: a report to the company with forms of evidence that it could 
use in their decision-making processes and the concurrent possibility to 
contribute to the scientific literature in communities interested in the relation 
between cognition, technology, and work. As a result of my investigation, the 
airline decided not to have the same pilots fly two versions of the same aircraft 
based on an analysis of pilot errors and a generic description of how to locate 
possible trouble spots in company procedures (MAVIN, ROTH, SOO & MUNRO, 
2015). At the same time, I prepared a text to be submitted for publication in a 
scientific research journal, which took an ecological perspective on the question 
of how a cockpit (not the pilot!) forgets speeds and speed-related events (ROTH, 
MAVIN & MUNRO, 2015). [26]
4. Transactional Ethics: From Analysis to Praxis
A transactional approach allows us to grasp the ethical dimension of the 
irreducible social act. Although not conceived in terms of ethics, methodological 
reflection on the researcher-participant relation has revealed the dual direction of 
its effects, as captured in the conceptual couplet of transference (redirection of 
the participant's feelings to the researcher) and countertransference 
(DEVEREUX, 1968). Every research project also is an observation performed on 
the researcher. Accordingly, as noted in the introduction, research ethics works  
two ways rather than in the one way presupposed in current institutional 
processes of research ethics review. Research in the social sciences gives rise to 
anxieties, which remain even when a pseudo-methodology attempts to ward off 
the effect of countertransference—the redirection of the researchers' feelings 
toward the participant. A transactional approach is necessary. Thus, "the 
behavioral scientist cannot ignore the interaction between subject and observer in 
the hope that, if he but pretends long enough that it does not exist, it will just 
quietly go away" (p.xviii). [27]
Research is a form of institution. Institutions are just when they work out in 
concrete practice the ethical intention to work with and for others may arise only 
when form and content of the ongoing conversation between researcher and 
participant are dialogic, that is, open to continual development. Some of my work 
has taken place in schools, which traditional approaches would describe in 
hierarchical terms with power in the hands of those higher up on a ladder 
constituting the institution. The idea underlying our work was that institutions are 
not just in themselves. Instead, just institutions are those that continuously 
become, oriented toward an ideal that is forever to come (Fr. à venir) because it 
forever lies in the future (Fr. à-venir). This is but another way of formulating ethics 
in a transactional, dialogical way such that ethics, as everything else, ends "when 
dialogue ends," for "dialogue, by its very essence, cannot and must not come to 
an end" (BAKHTIN, 1984, p.252). Research ethics, therefore, is not a concept but 
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something to be continuously achieved—in a strong sense, it remains one of the 
unfinalizable projects of humanity. [28]
A transactional ethics, dialogical in form and content, cannot ever be achieved, is 
not, and never is: a transactional ethics always is becoming, a "(future) 
transactional ethics to come." An exemplary research project in which such an 
approach to ethics is consequently pursued took place in the context of an inner-
city school of Philadelphia, where nearly 90% of students lived below the poverty 
line (e.g., ROTH & TOBIN, 2002). The schools we were working in and with are 
characterized by violence, absenteeism, and dysfunction. When their students 
were subjected to statewide testing procedures, these schools tended to end up 
on the bottom of the performance rankings. [29]
Initially conceptualized along the lines of empowerment, the researchers involved 
worked with students, teachers, administrators, and teachers in training. The 
research literally involved participating in schooling such that we did not allow 
ourselves to "observe" a lesson without actually contributing to teaching it. All 
researchers and observers were becoming integral part to the situation observed, 
practitioners among practitioners. We developed a set of guidelines that in 
essence constituted a non-additive, collective responsibility for teaching and 
learning (ROTH & TOBIN, 2002). Our research was to assist all involved in 
transforming the conditions. Thus, for example, following a lesson we (a 
researcher and responsible teacher educator) met with teacher, teacher-in-
training, and student representatives. Sometimes the department heads were 
also involved. We discussed what worked, what did not work, and how to institute 
changes to turn things for the better. The discussions were very open and frank, 
where students articulated problems of teaching to the same degree that 
teachers might be in articulating issues of attention and behavior; or teachers and 
students alike acknowledged having behaved in ways that aggravated the 
problems during the lesson. As a result of this research the teaching-learning 
situation improved in the participating classes. In this situation, the research was 
indistinguishable from the effort of changing the conditions that the participants 
held together. These changes were based on the knowledge generated in the 
course of dialogue, which, because of its characteristics, we rightfully termed 
cogenerative dialogue; metalogues—a metalogue is a conversation about some 
problematic subject ... such that not only do the participants discuss the problem 
but the structure of the conversation as a whole is also relevant to the same 
subject" (BATESON, 1987, p.13)—served to articulate and represent, in a 
dialogical way, conclusions in the matter of arising within our researcher-
practitioner team. [30]
The change in the condition of schooling certainly was a desirable outcome. But 
our work did not stop there. We also worked toward contributing to the research 
literature. However, rather than leaving publication to the academics, our writing 
process that followed our classroom-transforming cogenerative dialogue sessions 
also included all its members. Thus, for example, after investigating what could 
be learned from a lesson where a teacher had "screwed up" according to his own 
account, we published a research report that included a high school student, her 
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teacher, a teacher-in-training, her supervisor, and the visiting researcher (ROTH, 
TOBIN, ZIMMERMANN, BRYANT & DAVIS, 2002). In that article, the two 
academics did not usurp and ventriloquize the voices of the other participants. 
Instead, choosing the transcription of cogenerative dialogues, emails, and other 
productions, all participants in the writer collective presented their own voices. In 
another instance, a teacher and his student had clashed in such a severe manner 
that an expulsion from school of the otherwise well-intended students was 
considered. Again, the researcher came together with the student, a teacher-in-
training and master-of-arts-in-teaching student, her supervisor, the teacher, and a 
post-doctoral fellow who had worked with the student (ROTH et al., 2004). After 
having conducted interviews with the different stakeholders, all came together for 
a long meeting as a result of which the issue was resolved, the student could 
return to the classroom and continue on his trajectory toward academic success. 
In the published research paper, the key participants (i.e., teacher and student) 
spoke with and in their own voice rather than having others (e.g., academic 
researchers) speak for them. [31]
In all of this work, both in relation to teaching and research, co-responsibility was 
non-additive: with any one's failing, we all failed, and with any one's gain, we all 
gained. For example, with respect to teaching, actions manifested not only 
willingness to make place for the contributions of others but also willingness to 
take the place that was created. We conceived of a conductor-less orchestration 
of the lessons characterized by mutual respect. Students not only accepted a role 
as learners but also a role as teachers of teachers (e.g., on how to teach kids like 
them); teachers accepted their role as teachers as much as that of learners. The 
cogenerative dialogue sessions also had an associated list of heuristics—not 
formal ethical laws—that allowed participants to check whether the collective 
behavior provided evidence for mutual respect, rapport, inclusion of all 
stakeholders, constitution of an equitable playing field, and search for 
transformative potentials. [32]
5. Coda
Institutional ethics reviews of qualitative research projects fall short of the 
phenomenon of practical ethics—or, in other words, ethics in the mundane 
conduct of everyday life—because of their focus on researchers considered as 
elements imbued with certain characteristics rather than approaching the ethical 
relation as an irreducible unit. I exhibit an example of this failure in the way that 
institutional ethics committees approach the question of power, unilaterally 
attributed to the researcher. The position developed here situates ethical 
questions in the praxis of doing research, always involving researchers and 
participants alike. The questions concerning such a practical approach to ethics 
no longer can be answered by a researcher's institutional ethics committee 
because participants in general are not part of the institution but integral to the 
ethical praxis. Having been a member of an institutional research ethics 
committee and having served as its chair for three years, I am aware of the 
(collective) fear of some that individual researchers might be irrational. But such 
fears tend to be unfounded, for "the actually performed act in its undivided 
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wholeness is more than rational—it is answerable" (BAKHTIN, 1993, p.29). As a 
community, we have to work harder to move further in working through the 
questions posed by a radical reformulation of ethics proposed here. [33]
The transactional perspective developed here certainly is not unfamiliar to many 
indigenous peoples, especially those with verb-based languages. Verbs manifest 
the relation between things in world continuously in progress (TRIPPETT, 2000). 
Associated with this way of articulating and thinking about the world is the co-
thematization of the observer, which is integral to the transactional perspective as 
noted above. This is so "because when people understand their surroundings as 
comprising relationships between things, they cannot speak about the 
relationships without speaking about themselves" (p.15). What if we began to 
speak about researchers and participants using a verb-based discourse, which 
characterizes stakeholders in terms of what they do and situates all of them and 
their discourse in a relational world? The transactional perspective allows us to 
move beyond the anachronistic versions of ethics grounded in individuals and 
their interactions. Among others, the ethics and politics of institutional review 
boards—often unattended to by institutional review boards themselves (e.g., 
ROTH, 2004)—come into the focus in the transactional approach. [34]
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